When people think about space cybersecurity, they often think about satellites.
That is understandable. Space assets are visible, strategic and technically complex. They operate in a difficult environment and often support services with national, commercial or scientific importance.
But secure space communication does not begin in orbit.
It begins on Earth.
Ground stations, control centres, research networks, cloud platforms, partner systems and operational workstations all form part of the wider communication chain. They transmit commands, receive data, support analysis, manage identities, distribute software updates and connect organisations that need to work together.
If this ground environment is not secure, the trustworthiness of the space communication chain is weakened.
The ground segment is often the most accessible part of space infrastructure. It may include facilities, networks and systems that are connected to wider enterprise environments, supplier platforms or research institutions. Unlike space assets, many ground systems are reachable, maintainable and integrated with standard digital infrastructure. That makes them easier to upgrade, but also more exposed to conventional cyber threats.
Attackers do not need to target the most exotic part of a system if a more practical path exists.
A compromised administrator account, insecure remote access channel, vulnerable software component, poorly managed certificate, misconfigured cloud service or supplier weakness can all create risk. In many cases, the path to sensitive space-related data or communication systems may run through ordinary terrestrial infrastructure.
This is why securing the ground segment is a central part of space cyber resilience.
1. Visibility
The first requirement is visibility.
Organisations need to understand which systems participate in communication flows. This includes obvious components such as ground stations and control systems, but also supporting services: identity providers, certificate authorities, key-management systems, monitoring platforms, software repositories, data-processing environments, APIs and partner connections.
Without this visibility, it is difficult to protect the full chain.
A secure communication architecture depends on knowing where data travels, which systems handle it, who can access it and which controls protect it at each stage. Blind spots create assumptions. Assumptions create risk.
2. Strong identity and access control
The second requirement is strong identity and access control.
Ground-segment systems often involve multiple user groups: operators, engineers, researchers, administrators, suppliers and external partners. Each group may need different levels of access. Some access may be temporary. Some may require elevated privileges. Some may involve remote connections from partner organisations or managed-service providers.
In this environment, identity must be treated as a security foundation.
Access should be granted according to clear roles and operational need. Privileged access should be tightly controlled, monitored and reviewed. Remote access should be secured through strong authentication and appropriate segmentation. Service accounts and machine identities should be governed with the same seriousness as human users.
3. Secure key and certificate management
The third requirement is secure key and certificate management.
Ground systems rely heavily on cryptographic trust. Certificates may authenticate systems and services. Keys may protect communication channels, sign software updates, secure data transfers or support encrypted storage. If these assets are poorly managed, the security of communication can be undermined even when strong algorithms are used.
Key material should be generated, stored, rotated and revoked through defined processes. Certificates should be inventoried and renewed before expiry. Ownership should be clear. Emergency replacement procedures should exist before they are needed.
This is also where post-quantum readiness becomes relevant.
As cryptographic standards evolve, organisations will need to understand which ground-segment systems depend on cryptographic mechanisms that may need to change. Systems designed with crypto-agility will be easier to adapt. Systems with hard-coded or undocumented cryptography will be harder to migrate.
4. Segmentation
The fourth requirement is segmentation.
Not every system in the ground environment should be able to communicate with every other system. Sensitive operational systems, research data environments, administrative services and external partner connections should be separated according to risk.
Good segmentation limits the movement of an attacker if one part of the environment is compromised. It also helps enforce trust boundaries between organisations, functions and levels of sensitivity.
Segmentation is not only a network issue. It also includes identity segmentation, data segmentation, application permissions and operational procedures. The goal is to reduce unnecessary exposure while preserving the communication needed for research and operations.
5. Secure software and update management
The fifth requirement is secure software and update management.
Ground systems depend on software. That software may come from internal development teams, vendors, open-source projects, specialist suppliers or operational platforms. Updates may need to be deployed across systems that have different availability requirements and maintenance windows.
A secure ground segment needs reliable mechanisms for verifying, testing and deploying software changes. Digital signatures, trusted repositories, vulnerability monitoring and controlled release processes all play a role.
Software integrity is especially important when systems support communication with high-value infrastructure. A malicious or compromised update can become a path into the wider environment.
6. Monitoring and response
The sixth requirement is monitoring and response.
Security controls cannot prevent every incident. Ground-segment environments need the ability to detect unusual behaviour, investigate events and respond quickly. Logs from communication systems, identity platforms, remote access services, key-management systems and critical applications should support meaningful analysis.
Monitoring should not be treated as a compliance exercise. It should be designed around the real ways communication systems could be misused or disrupted.
For example, unusual certificate activity, unexpected access attempts, abnormal data transfers, changes in privileged accounts or failed authentication patterns may all provide early warning. The value of monitoring depends on whether the organisation can interpret the signals and act on them.
7. Partner and supplier governance
The seventh requirement is partner and supplier governance.
Space research rarely operates in isolation. Ground-segment communication often depends on external organisations, suppliers and shared infrastructure. Each connection adds value, but also extends the trust boundary.
Partners should have clear security responsibilities. Suppliers should provide transparency about update practices, cryptographic support, vulnerability handling, access requirements and lifecycle commitments. Shared communication channels should be governed rather than improvised.
This is particularly important for long-term projects, where systems and partnerships may evolve over time.
8. Resilience
The eighth requirement is resilience.
Ground-segment security is not only about preventing compromise. It is also about maintaining continuity when disruption occurs. Organisations should plan how communication can continue, degrade safely or recover after failure.
This may involve backup communication paths, incident response procedures, recovery plans, offline key material, tested restoration processes and clear decision-making authority during security events.
A resilient ground segment should be able to withstand pressure without losing control of trust.
The COSMOS-SECURE perspective
COSMOS-SECURE focuses on secure communication in space research because communication is the foundation that connects systems, partners and data. The ground segment is central to that foundation.
Securing it requires more than protecting individual devices. It requires a full-chain view of trust: from identity to encryption, from key management to monitoring, from supplier governance to post-quantum readiness.
For organisations involved in space research, the message is straightforward.
Do not treat the ground segment as a secondary concern. It is where many communication risks emerge, where many controls can be implemented and where long-term resilience can be built.
Space communication may reach beyond Earth.
But its security starts here.